Daily Archives: 2013-05-12

Ma the bumbler

长姿势了。马英九在独台的路上越走越远。

東海波濤洶湧中的台灣

「妒才」是馬英九個性的致命傷。

妒才的人其实还真不少。

在美华人的天花板(3):原因初探


Ma the bumbler

Nov 17th 2012 The Economist

WHEN he was first elected in 2008, Taiwan’s president, Ma Ying-jeou, offered Taiwanese high hopes that the island’s economy would open a new chapter. He promised ground-breaking agreements with China to help end Taiwan’s growing economic marginalisation. At the time, Mr Ma’s image was of a clean technocrat able to rise above the cronyism and infighting of his party, the Kuomintang (KMT). He was a welcome contrast to his fiery and pro-independence predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, now in jail for corruption.

Five years on, and despite being handily re-elected ten months ago, much has changed. In particular, popular satisfaction with Mr Ma has plummeted, to a record low of 13%, according to the TVBS Poll Centre. The country appears to agree on one thing: Mr Ma is an ineffectual bumbler.

Ordinary people do not find their livelihoods improving. Salaries have stagnated for a decade. The most visible impact of more open ties with China, which include a free-trade agreement, has been property speculation in anticipation of a flood of mainland money. Housing in former working-class areas on the edge of Taipei, the capital, now costs up to 40 times the average annual wage of $15,400. The number of families below the poverty line has leapt. Labour activists have taken to pelting the presidential office with eggs.

Exports account for 70% of GDP. So some of Taiwan’s problems are down to the dismal state of rich-world economies. Yet Mr Ma’s leadership is also to blame. He has failed to paint a more hopeful future, with sometimes hard measures needed now. Worse, he frequently tweaks policies in response to opposition or media criticism. It suggests indecisiveness.

Public anger first arose in June, when Mr Ma raised the price of government-subsidised electricity. Few Taiwanese understood why, even though Taiwan’s state-owned power company loses billions. In the face of public outrage, Mr Ma postponed a second round of electricity price rises scheduled for December. They will now take place later next year.

People are also worried that a national pension scheme is on course for bankruptcy in less than two decades. Yet Mr Ma cannot bring himself to raise premiums sharply, because of the temporary unpopularity it risks. When Mr Ma does try to appeal to Taiwanese who make up the island’s broad political centre, it often backfires with his party’s core supporters. Following public grumbles that retired civil servants, teachers and ex-servicemen were a privileged group, the cabinet announced plans to cut more than $300m in year-end bonuses, affecting around 381,000. The trouble was, veterans are among the KMT’s most fervent backers. Now some threaten to take to the streets in protest and deprive the KMT of their votes until the plan is scrapped. Meanwhile, Mr Ma’s clean image has been sullied by the indictment of the cabinet secretary-general for graft.

Cracks are starting to grow in the KMT façade. Recently Sean Lien, a prominent politician, criticised Mr Ma’s economic policies, saying that any politician in office during this time of sluggish growth was at best a “master of a beggar clan”—implying a country of paupers.

But the next election is four years away, and presidential hopefuls will not try to oust or even outshine Mr Ma anytime soon. After all, they will not want to take responsibility for the country’s economic problems. Nothing suggests Mr Ma’s main policies will change (or that they should), but his credibility is draining by the day.

专访李永波

“犹豫你找不到,你总感觉对与不对你就找不到正确的方向,你要消耗掉很多的时间,你会走很多的弯路。 ”

同感。虽然“金牌论”引起了很多争议,但是我觉得这句话才是真正的核心。果然人生经历一帆风顺的大户们是无法理解个中曲直的。

原文中的所有图片都失效了。


专访李永波

(2012-09-17 14:19:53) 《看见》

PART1

【演播室】:这是中国羽毛球队的总教练李永波,在伦敦奥运会上,率队首次包揽羽毛球项目的全部冠军之后的留影,这张照片上,他把五块金牌都挂在胸前,笑容灿烂,不过,了解更多背景的人,也许能够从这张照片中读出更深的意味,在那一时刻,这位中国羽毛球的掌门人,面临着前所未有的荣耀,也面对着前所未有的压力。

(影像:林丹夺金 李永波冲上去拥抱)

解说:旁观者也许很难想像李永波这一刻的心情,这拥抱和欢呼,代表着中国羽毛球队夺取奥运五枚金牌的巅峰时刻,但也代表着,他率领的中国羽毛球队克服了这十几天来沉重的舆论质疑,交出了他们在体育成绩上的完美答卷,但是,还有另一份答卷在等待着他。这场原本普通的小组赛,最终成为2012年伦敦奥运会上,最受关注和争议的比赛之一。来自中国、韩国、印尼三个国家的四对选手,被认为违反了世界羽联的运动员行为条例,即“未尽全力去赢得比赛”和“做出了明显有辱于或有害于羽毛球运动的行为”,被认定“消极比赛”,最终全部被取消剩余比赛的参赛资格。中国羽毛球队总教练李永波,在8月1号向公众道歉之后,第二天在微博上公布:“该负的责任我一定负”, 并称:“等比赛结束我会择机把过程分析给大家听。”。但是,一个月以来,他一直没再提起此事,任何媒体问起,他都以“不要再纠缠过去”来回答。但这件事情,在他自己心底会反复交战,挥之不去。

李永波:太草率了吧,凭什么取消运动员的比赛,我不明白。//10年来世界羽联从来没有处罚过任何消极比赛的人,没有任何轻微的处罚。

记者:我听你的说法等于说其实象这样校际比赛的情况以前都发生过?

李永波:在汤姆斯杯当中,/ 印尼跟马来西亚比赛都不愿意碰到中国队的时候// 他让单打运动员去打双打,双打运动员打单打,这是不是消极比赛? 应该是吧/结果怎么样呢,世界羽联也不会罚。

记者:有没有这种说法,他说明显有辱于羽毛球运动,就是觉得做的太明显了?//

李永波:这个比赛打到这样确实是肯定不好看的,作为我来讲,非常难看,但是你之前前面没有从来没有标准,你制订的规则有问题//人家只是钻你的空子。

记者:它可能觉得这个方式公然的嘲弄裁判和观众的智商?

李永波:其他不是吗,博尔特跑到最后20米的他不使劲跑了,他已经第一了,是不是消极比赛?足球比赛已经出线了,我主力不上场,我全派非主力,是不是消极比赛?NBA的篮球比赛,还剩下最后10分钟,领先30分垃圾时间全是替补上场,是不是消极比赛?都可以处罚的。

记者:以前出现过用这样的方式消极比赛吗?

李永波:消极比赛一定要有方式吗?对你来讲消极比赛的方式是什么?

记者:运动员没有拼尽全力去比赛,我说的这个方式甚至说发球不过网,而且一再出线这样的方式。

李永波:这个很尴尬的,是你说对不起观众,对不起球迷,对不起等等等等,当然一定是,关键是他们都不想赢,//你发过网了,你发过去了你肯定,人家不接。

解说:这次消极比赛的出现,与伦敦奥运会上国际羽联制定的新比赛规则有关。为了增加明星球员的出场次数,减少比赛偶然性,国际羽联决定把以前的“淘汰赛制”改为先小组赛,再淘汰赛,容易出现同一国高水平选手提前相遇并火拼的情况,导致一些比赛中出现双方都不想赢,“竞输”却能获利的局面。在本场比赛之前,于洋/王晓理和韩国的郑景银/金荷娜均已小组出线,他们之间的胜者将获得小组第一,由于早先中国队另一对女双组合在D组名列小组第二,因此如果于洋/王晓理击败韩国选手,那么她们作为A组第一和D组第二将很有可能在半决赛中提前相遇。李永波说,在他原来的推断中,韩国队如果赢了这场球,刚好可以和她们本国选手避开,但是没想到韩国队也求输,宁可自己碰上,也要让中国队选手撞车,李永波说这对他来说也是意外。

记者:就是说打的这种方式是现场出现的?

李永波:对,是现场出现的。

记者:不是你之前的战术布置?

李永波:当然不是我的战术布置了,怎么可能呢,谁不知道这样对不起观众,对不起球迷,对不起羽毛球运动,怎么可能这样/

(影像:嘘声 )

记者:你是那么珍爱荣誉的人,如果坐那场边,然后听到观众的嘘声。

李永波:也没想到会是这种局面。// /而且我们的选择是没有伤害第三者,是不好看, 打的不好看。

记者:他可能是觉得会伤害那些购票进入这么多的观众吧。

李永波:6000观众。

记者:包括看电视直播的人。您觉得也不用管他们的反映吗?

李永波:不是,如果想到这个反映了就不会这样了//所以说我们没想到,最终他激励我们一定要打好比赛,没受影响,当然我们知道这是一个非常非常大的经验教训,宝贵的教训,所以说一定要想尽一切办法要杜绝这样的事情再发生。

解说:此事之后,中国体育代表团发出声明,“中国奥委会历来反对任何人、任何队伍、任何形式的违反体育精神和体育道德的做法,各参赛队伍要继续弘扬奥林匹克精神,维护奥林匹克宗旨”。很快,李永波公开道歉:

李永波的道歉。

解说:而因为多个国家都出现了消极比赛,舆论也关注规则争议。

记者:我想知道在程序上你们教练员有没有可能对这个规则进行申诉?

李永波:没有用啊,没有用,世界羽联根本不听你。

记者:你试过是吗?

李永波:试过无数次提案,没有用没有一次被接纳的,7届奥运会全是淘汰赛,如果是淘汰赛沿袭以前的方式,它不可能产生这样的事情,就算咱们打,你只要输了就没有机会,我们也必须全力以赴,你非正了小组赛,让大家去先打一打,你就不知道给我这样的机会吗?

记者:当时主流的声音也是说,规则可以利用,只是不是这么个利用法。

李永波:只能说当时的想法。

解说:因为多个国家出现类似让球事件,世界羽联也在反思此事,将在今年11月召开会议,对各方意见持开放态度。而对于李永波,舆论也出现多方看法,有媒体认为,人们总在批评他‘太想赢’,不想赢的教练员还能当教练吗?我们很多人都被岁月磨圆了,但是李永波是少有的那么几个,没被磨圆还有棱角的人。他是一个有缺点的真汉子,而不是外表看起来无懈可击的伪君子或者说完人”

但也有媒体责备李永波“我只是利用一下规则”的想法在执教生涯中一直存在。现年50岁的李永波,领军中国羽毛球队近20年,曾培养出73个世界冠军球员,他的意志、决断、训练方法,曾经让中国羽毛球队在短时间内迅速提升,得到16枚奥运金牌,20座团体赛奖杯,他曾被认为,为了更有把握夺冠,要求队员之间让球,也会通过让高水平运动员退赛使中国其他运动员拿到更多积分,获得奥运入场券。

(李永波同期:让球是因为有实力,外国人想让让不了。)

解说:媒体在描述李永波时用的最多的词是他个性强势,坐阵比赛现场时,如果他认为发生不公正,会直接对裁判叫喊,也会直接对球员喊话来形成场上压力,他说用这个方式来帮助自己的队员。

李永波:规则允许的事情,其实是可以做的。

记者:你从来没有因为这个受到过警示,或者处罚吗?

李永波:有提醒过,说不要这样//因为他们跟我太熟了,我1981年开始参加国际比赛,世界羽联换了多少代人了,主席换了10个了,裁判换了多少批了,我当运动员跟我当裁判人的现在当裁判长了,我当总教练了。

记者:是不是你觉得您的江湖地位你觉得可以不要那么多顾忌?

李永波:有的时候会钻一点空子,就会觉得他们不会对我怎么样,要是其他教练他们肯定不允许的,//我这边他们最多笑一笑,//确实资格很老。

记者:所以有一部分人会认为你这么做是非常捍卫自己球队和自己球员的利益,很感动,也有人觉得这样做,会比较蛮横,比较跋扈,你怎么讲?

李永波:如果是因为跋扈了一点,蛮横了一点,但是确实对我的队员能够起到促进的作用,我宁可这样做。///竟技场上呢,因为金牌是唯一的标准。

记者:唯一的?

李永波:唯一的。

PART2

解说:在成为中国羽毛球队总教练之前,李永波是一位出色的羽毛球运动员,曾经获得多项世界冠军。他和田秉义组合的男子双打,曾经在上个世纪八十年代维持在世界顶尖水平长达六七年之久。他个性很强,打得不如意时,会在场上摔拍子,冲裁判和队友叫嚷,因为成绩好,没有受过处罚。作为运动员,这种个性,反映在大赛中,有求胜的渴望和坚强的意志,1992年,羽毛球成为奥运会正式比赛项目,李永波退役前最后一场比赛,但首场比赛即意外受伤,之后他带伤上阵和田秉毅一路坚持拼到半决赛,最后获得一枚铜牌。

记者:你自己如果说明知道说夺金无望,而且对身体会造成伤害,为什么还要这么玩命?

李永波:受伤了,坚持了,就算断了你也会坚持去打,就算明知道说下一场球可能会断掉,也不会放弃,就是想反正是最后一个比赛了。我觉得我就是能豁得出去的,到了最关键的时候。

记者:你豁得出去是为了得到什么?

李永波:荣誉吧,我想是荣誉。

解说:李永波带伤拼回来的一块铜牌,当时已经是中国羽毛球队男队最好成绩,也是唯一的一块铜牌。但他说,拿了铜牌回来的他,没有人理会。

记者:没有人把这个当回事?

李永波:因为在之前的时候,我受伤,然后坚持,每一天的代表团的会议当中,都会反复的把我的这个精神这种精神,当成一种教材在这个会议上,总结会,小结会上来说,可当我比赛结束拿一块铜牌的时候,再也没有人提到这件事情了,我觉得绝对是非常非常大的悲哀,实际上那种情况下,对我是一种打击。

记者:这个打击是什么?

李永波:很不是滋味对一个人来讲,就是说有一点太现实,有一点太残酷。所以说当比赛结束,回来的时候,我们都是一瘸一拐的回来的//不再有人问你什么,你会有时候会说到底为了什么,有的时候自己会去想,///你只有站在冠军领奖台上那一天才算成功,只要没拿冠军永远是失败的,总是在输。

解说:1993年,31岁的李永波在众多老教练的推荐下,从恩师王文教手中接过国家队教鞭,成为了中国羽毛球队的领军人物。上任后,他加强队伍管理,引进新鲜血液,组织新的教练班子,进行了一系列改革,一年后1994年的广岛亚运会上,李永波带领的中国羽毛球队获得七枚铜牌,但被当时的舆论称为破铜烂铁。

记者:这就是公开的评价?

李永波:对,7块就是一堆破铜烂铁

记者:那破铜烂铁给你的刺激是什么?

李永波:必须承受啊,憋足了劲再来,只有这样。

解说:那一年,处境不好的李永波,冬天想把队员的木头窗户换成铝合金,好抵御些寒风,但他说那时一分钱都没有。对金牌的渴望,支撑着中国羽毛球队卧薪尝胆。

(李:巴塞罗那我们一块金牌也没拿到,96年的亚特兰大奥运会,我希望至少拿到一块金牌)

亚特兰大奥运会,比赛前夜,李永波失眠。

李永波:一直睡不着,就一直在想所有的结果,赢了会怎么怎么样,输了会怎么怎么样。

记者:那块金牌对当时的你来说意味着什么呢?

李永波:金牌看起来不大,领奖那一刻时间也很短,但它带来的东西太大了,巨大,所以你能想有多大就有多大。

记者:它会带来什么?

李永波:第一,从我们来讲金牌带来的说你对整个工作的肯定//其次它更重要一点,说明你所制定的这些训练体系,管理体系,等等等等的一切是合理的,///后人会沿着这条路不断的去发展,如果你拿不到金牌,就会带来更多的东西,对你所有的工作会置疑,你自己会怀疑,运动员会怀疑,外界也会怀疑,同行也会怀疑,人就怕犹豫。

记者:犹豫怎么了?

李永波:犹豫你找不到,你总感觉对与不对你就找不到正确的方向,你要消耗掉很多的时间,你会走很多的弯路。

解说:这次奥运会,葛菲顾俊的双打为球队实现了金牌零的突破,这天之后李永波有两天时间兴奋地没有睡觉,这一次是因为奥运金牌的滋味。

记者:你之前也曾经承受过,很长时间的各种各样的怀疑,包括冷落,在那个时候认可会以什么方式来到呢?

李永波:在我们的生活体系里,非常的明显,不象普通人。当你打的不好的时候,人家看你是一种什么表情你会很清楚,当你打好的时候,人家又是一种灿烂的笑容面对你的时候,太直接了,对心灵的碰撞太直接太直接了,我从小就是看着别人的脸色成长起来的。

李永波:我相信这个世界上没有多少人,已经更不可能有了,就是你坐到那里心脏已经到心里了,然后就到嘴里了,然后又把它咽下去了// 就在瞬间一秒钟的时候,心脏就含在嘴里,就等于这个心脏要从嘴里跳出来,然后又把它一下咽下去了,一秒钟之内,我最少不下10次。

(竞技 狂热 成功 失败 )

解说:摘金之路从此展开,李永波说,年青的羽毛球队需要更多的胜利才能证明自己。2000年悉尼奥运,羽毛球女单半决赛,丹麦选手马丁率先晋级决赛;另一场半决赛在中国选手叶钊颖和龚智超两人之间展开。因为龚智超对马丁有更大优势,教练组讨论之后,叶钊颖让球,将龚智超送上女单决赛舞台,最终,龚智超战胜马丁拿下冠军,而叶钊颖获得铜牌。四年后雅典奥运会,这个情节再次上演。在过往采访中,李永波曾公开承认,让球事件确有其事。

影像:资料

李永波:确实,每个运动员都很难接受让球,当时叶钊颖也哭了,不愿意放弃,最后她还是哭着说尊重队伍的选择。”

柴静:这两个人都是为了打这场比赛,等了四年,练了四年,让后到现在说因为要一个更高的集体荣誉,所以我要退下来,这对他们来讲公平吗?

李永波:肯定是不公平,但是有一个前提,她的状态已经不是顶峰了,夺取冠军的概率已经很小了。

记者:所以你的意思是?

李永波:所以在那一刻呢,他对马丁输多胜少,就是因为你已经在退下坡路,拿冠军的可能性很小,但是我们是需要冠军升国旗奏国歌的,是这样的一种情况。她也同意了。

解说:这场球对叶钊颖来说,是她职业生涯夺取奥运冠军的最后机会,也是她四年前对自己的承诺:

(四年前资料:叶钊颖“(夺取冠军)我还有机会,4年后,我26岁,年龄还不是很大”)

(让球输了后,叶钊颖脸上的表情)

记者:她也哭了不是吗?

李永波:我也会哭啊,赢了也有哭的吗,不很多人赢了也哭了

记者:是一种释放,或者是一种百感交集的,她是为什么呢?

李永波:我不知道,因为没有太多的沟通。

记者:他的心态会不会像1992年的你,在自己退役的一战里面,她会拼尽全力?

李永波:当然我想她是这样,应该是这样//但它人就是这样,所有的事情不可能以自己的意志为转移,你在这个集体当中,你还是要有为集体风险的精神,我是这么想的。中国人自相残杀,傻啊?

记者:可能有自己的想法这不叫自相残杀?

李永波:负责任是吗?这就是不同的角度,你还可以把它上升到理论,上升到道德和体育精神,还可以上升到这里。

记者:其实这是她的感受。

李:是,她的想法我很尊重,(应该)尽可能的做到不要让人家留下遗憾。

解说: 2004年,李永波提出了“要培养一百个世界冠军”的目标。2008年北京奥运会,中国羽毛球队包揽五金的呼声达到最高,但那一年,最后三枚金牌的战绩,让李永波未能梦想成真。在今年伦敦奥运会前,李永波曾经说:“我觉得这次外界给我们的压力远远大于任何一届,甚于2008年。人们不看过程只看结果,结果是上去了就下不来了。”他生活在对金牌的巨大渴望与压力之下,甚至在公开场合表示,希望没有奥运会就好了,羽毛球可以成为更民间、更健康的运动,让人们单纯享受每一拍的乐趣。

李永波:说你打到第三名,你打到第四名,你打的非常的艰苦,你非常努力,体现出奥林匹克精神,体育精神,淋漓尽致,谁看到了,那些小孩子知道吗?不知道。他看什么,他喜不喜欢羽毛球,他看你能不能拿冠军,我体会特别深,我的儿子打羽毛球就是因为这一点,13岁那一天,在首都机场他来接,我们夺取了汤姆斯杯,//他在机场的时候一看,怎么那么记者,那么多人找林丹,找鲍春来…照相,他回来跟我讲,爸爸我要打羽毛球,就是这么简单其实,就这么一件事,就这一件荣誉,它可以影响很多人。

记者:但是你之前身负重伤,当然穷尽全力的时候,不也是一种精神吗?

李永波:这种精神只会被那些高尚的人看到,不是每个人都能看到,。

记者:是因为看到的人太少是吗?

李永波:对,能看到的人非常少,所以当你真正竭尽全力去最后拿一个银牌和铜牌的时候,瞬间就会被人忘掉,就会遗忘,那只有那些竭尽全力也受伤,最后还能站在冠军领奖台上,可能才给人们留下永久的记忆,我当时就是这种体会。

PART3

解说:李永波说自己从小就不喜欢输的感觉,无论做什么,他都一定要争第一,哪怕是游戏。

李永波:只是要有竞争的游戏,包括到现在为止打扑克,干什么我都是跑步我也要跑第一,无论是什么样,我都觉得我不能落后,骨子里就是这样。///  

记者:你会觉得自己有点胜负心比较重吗?

李永波:会,因为我从事的工作就是整天伴随着胜负,我看重胜,我不愿面对负。

记者:你不喜欢输的感觉?

李永波:一直以来都不喜欢输的感觉,所以不管干什么我都是追求胜的。

解说:在刚加入国际竞赛的最初,一个发展中国家对于竞争和求胜充满渴望,作为一个体育人的原始本能受到激励,最鲜明的指标就是金牌,但在参与竞争近半年世纪后,中国的体育文化也在发生改变,在2011年的中国羽毛球公开赛上,李永波的爱将林丹主场对阵马来西亚名将李宗伟时,在林丹领先的情况下,观众席上有不少中国观众为李宗伟加油,当时的李永波曾在媒体上公开抱怨此事,认为这些中国观众没有立场,不爱国。

李永波:就是因为那一声喊,林丹连丢四分输掉了那一局。

记者:你是很直率,但有没有一种可能,他们认为是一种体育上的修养?您作为东道主来讲,对于双方都给予鼓励,这也是一种体育精神?

李永波:也许是这样,即便是这样,他的想法是这样的,难道我就不能说的想法吗?我只是表露我的想法而已,我不用对错衡量。

记者:因为毕竟是公众人物。

李永波:但是公众人物也不能装啊,当你是公众人物的时候,你不表露真的东西,你是公众人物你就装,那你给人家的影响是什么,不是真实的自己,这个公共人物会带来什么样的影响,有什么意义吗?

记者:你已经带领中国羽毛球到这个境界之后,人们可能会有一个更高的期许,他们会希望是要呈现的是更高的体育文明,这个你理解吗?

李永波:现在大家在喊的时候,我也都理解了,就是第一次的时候,很突然,很多人为外国人加油,我很不理解,现在没问题。这样的话,队员们也慢慢接受,也承受这样东西,他承受的东西更多,他可能对他将来遇到的一些事情,他会更有针对性的面对,会有方法,这并没有什么不行的。

解说:人们的期待和愿望都在发生改变,从单一的胜负论中摆脱出来。对叶钊颖、周密的让球事件,他还会本能地为自己当年的决定解释,但他也坦承当年的作法不当,造成伤害。

李永波:我想能避免的就一定要尽最大努力去避免。

记者:避免什么?

李永波:就是这样的情况再发生,因为确实不论是对媒体也好,对体育比赛也好,还是对个人也好,都是一种伤害,其实我是非常不赞成的。

李永波:那时候是很年轻的时候,2004年很年轻,而且那时候队伍也没有像今天这么强,那时候需要一些好的成绩来巩固整个羽毛球的很多很多的当时,会做出一些选择,后来我回来,我们总局领导也批评我。

记者:是吗?

李永波:当然,不允许这样的。所以后来我们也借鉴也就不会再这样做。

解说:李永波有个性强硬的一面,但他的内心,也在随着外界评判而调整。在伦敦奥运会处罚刚下的时候,他曾经很愤怒,但随着中国体育代表团的严正声明,以及国内舆论的推动,他也向外界作出道歉。

李永波:其实我现在已经学会当别人骂我的时候,我也理解。他站在另一个角度上,他就认为我这件事做的不对,他就会骂我。我把这件事情当成一件好事,如果没有人骂你,你就不会再进步了,所以说我会正确的看这样的声音,所以有时候我说我还要感谢那些骂我的人,真的,他们在帮助我进步,帮助我强大。

解说:第二天他曾在微博里写过“该我负的责任,我一定会负”,不过,在中国羽毛球队在巨大压力下获得五块金牌之后,他不再向外界提及此事。而曾经要求他“下课”的呼声,在这五块金牌后渐渐平息。网络调查,有人认为“李永波,还欠一个解释”,但也有21.5%的人认为,他可以功过相抵。

李永波:奥运会本届奥运会会上所谓消极的事,不要再谈了,因为谈到不愉快的东西,一定会伤害别人。

记者:我好像觉得是于洋王晓理已经承受这个伤害了?

他:已经在慢慢的本身在非平这个受伤的心灵,你又提他对他是又一次伤害,我其实不太回忆太多,我这个人我不喜欢古的东西。可能我这是我的思想,我一直很乐观,我喜欢未来,喜欢现在,我不喜欢过去,说北京故宫我都不喜欢去。

记者:你刚才也提到人的成长是需要反思过去的错误才能需要往前走。

李永波:自己就够了

柴静:是不是你刚才说我自己看就行了,我不想当众把它说出来,是不是有这种思想?

李永波:应该是这样的。  

解说:8月中旬,韩国队总教练和女双教练被取消执教资格,四名队员禁赛两年。韩国总教练成汉国向媒体公开致歉表示:“不论是什么理由,都不应该发生这种事情,必须有一些需要防守的道德底线,我对于没能守住这些道德底线需要深刻的反省;在对球员的综合管理上,作为总教练我负有不可妥协的责任,表示深深的歉意。”  

记者:关于这个问题,韩国的这个教练有一个深刻的歉意……

李永波:当你策划完了以后结果还是一个失败者的时候,你必须得这么做。

记者:你觉得是拿了5块金牌,所以就不用再……?

李永波:也不是,5块金牌是我们的目标,我曾经说过一段话,无论你取得什么样的成绩,都要始终清醒在成绩过程当中寻找不足,因为这个不足会让你变的清醒,

记者:是。

李永波:所有的好成绩都掩盖不了这个不足,所以说这个不足就是经验,就是教训。

演播室:李永波在采访结束时匆忙离场是因为要赶飞机去外地,在这里我们谢谢他接受访问,从一开始他就说不愿意谈已经发生过的事情,他也有为自己辩解的人性本能,但听得出来,所有关于规则的争论和舆论的反应,都在他心里反复思量、不断调整。金牌是一个体育人的原始渴望,但是竞技体育的成熟就意味着他的参与者慢慢放下简单的胜负,必然走向更宽广的体育文明,正如现代奥运会的创始人顾拜旦所说的,奥运精神最重要的不是胜利,而是奋斗。我们采访的场地是中国羽毛球队的训练馆,在这个馆的墙壁上,原来的标语是李永波定的,“多吃苦,苦中有甜;多流汗,汗里有金”。在我们采访的时候,这句标语已经被他改成了一句简单的话,“你对今天的自己满意吗”?在这句话里,没有了放不下的胜负与得失,而是全力以赴,为自己而战的快乐。

Video:http://news.cntv.cn/program/kanjian/20120916/104079.shtml

齐桓公的货币战争

唯囤积居奇。


齐桓公的货币战争

Date here 王吉舟

2700年前,齐桓公姜小白有个好宰相,叫管仲。这俩人交情那叫一个铁呀,一个大权在握,一个比犹太人还精,他俩合起伙来兢兢业业的工作,结果搞定了全天下。管仲使齐国成为春秋五霸,这说起来好像挺牛逼的一个事情,但是事实上,作为当时其他地区的中国人,那可是倒了霉,因为除非你是齐国人,否则,全被这哥俩算计了,即使你是齐国人,除非你是这哥俩认可的精英,否则,你也就是个牲口,也被这哥俩算计,整天牧来牧去的,还给人家哥俩拼命数钱呢。

姜小白和管仲这俩人是“中国经济梦幻二人组”,他俩的经济理论那叫一个多啊,整个一部《管子》俩人一问一答跟说相声似的,各种经济学包袱都在那里记录着呢,这些理论,是很牛逼的,甚至完全超越时代的,比后世的《国富论》一点不含糊。

大家可能不信,说中国有如此伟大的经济学家?

您把那个问号去掉,后面加上——管仲,就是答案。管仲在经济学领域的境界,相当于同时代的孙子在军事领域的境界,不过,不难想象,管仲和姜小白哥俩白天合伙收拾天下男人,晚上肯定也忙着收拾成群的女人,那叫一个忙啊,白天日理万机,夜里多姿多彩。所以,管仲没时间写书,这点跟亚当斯密不一样。管仲自己不写,也没想起来找枪手写,结果,死了很多年后,齐国才整理他的著作,弄了个半截子文集叫《管子》,大家搞经济的一定要读,跟《国富论》对比着读,读完,你一定说:我FUCK!中国老祖宗怎么这么牛逼呢?跟管子比,犹太人算个小JB。犹太人这些花花肠子,感情老祖宗早都知道啊。没错!治理通货膨胀、货币战争、价格与市场、税收与财政、国家宏观调控、社会分工,管仲都整的特明白,比亚当斯密早明白了2000年。

别不信,这一套,管仲称其为“轻重论”,他还挺谦虚,说不是自己发明的,是学习先贤的,OMG!还有更先的贤??!!是谁啊?管仲说他们是“燧人氏、孙叔敖、单旗、泰奢、伯高……”

中国古代真的很神奇!(或许,我们民族的一出悲剧,是把半部《管子》治天下,错弄成了半部《论语》治天下。)

管仲跟姜小白实际上军事上不太行,齐军有点今天美军的味道,遇到弱的就撵出人家的屎来,遇到强的,经常被人家撵出屎(曹刽就撵的他俩裤子都跑丢了)。他俩打仗不行,玩阴的,搞货币战争可是不一般的行!今天美国用石油收拾全世界,日本用铁矿石、稀土收拾中国,这些个阴损的货币战争的影子,姜小白和管仲那是祖师爷。这哥俩仗着自己有钱,有IQ,一箭不放,收拾了好多国家。

不信的话,听胖舟讲故事吧,大家权当乐一乐,借古思今吧。

第一次货币战争:衡山之谋

衡山国夹在齐鲁之间,国民擅长制造战争机器,齐桓公想搞定他们又怕干不过人家,就让管仲想办法。管仲说:衡山国的工厂,造一台战争机器要一年半以上时间,我们去衡山国不计价格,以高价进口战争机器,燕国和代国听说后,必然害怕我们买机器是要攻打他们,他们要防备就肯定也来订购,他们一买,秦国赵国也害怕,也会来争着订购,衡山国的产量就那么一点,天下都来订购,机器肯定涨价十倍,到时候如此如此,肯定搞定。

    于是,齐桓公去衡山国高价定购战争机器,结果十个月后果然燕代赵秦先后来争购,衡山国君高兴坏了,把自己的机器涨价了十倍预定给了天下各国,等着发大财。衡山国大街小巷的人都去兵工厂制造机器,没有人种地了。十二个月之后,齐桓公又派外交通商事务大臣隰朋去赵国收购粮食,赵国粮食卖一石十五钱,隰朋给人家一石五十钱,全天下的商人都把粮食往齐国运输,再五个月后,全天下的粮食都到了齐国,全天下的粮食价格被齐国抬高了三倍。

订购战争机器十七个月后,高价炒作粮食五个月后,齐国忽然不要衡山国的机器了,还跟衡山国断交了。齐国一不要,其他国家也都不要了,衡山国君手里没粮食,也没赚到钱,傻逼了。衡山国只好去齐国进口粮食,很快财政破产,齐国攻打衡山国北部,鲁国攻打衡山国南部,衡山国君想了想,啥也不说了,带着全体贵族搬到齐国做齐国公民去了。

原文载于《管子、轻重》:桓公问于管子曰:“吾欲制衡山之术,为之奈何?”管子对曰:“公其令人贵买衡山之械器而卖之。燕、代必从公而买之,秦、赵闻之,必与公争之。衡山之械器必倍其贾,天下争之,衡山械器必什倍以上。”公曰:“诺。”因令人之衡山求买械器,不敢辩其贵贾。齐修械器于衡山十月,燕、代闻之,果令人之衡山求买械器,燕、代修三月,秦国闻之,果令人之衡山求买械器。衡山之君告其相曰,“天下争吾械器,令其贾再什以上。”衡山之民释其本,修械器之巧。齐即令隰朋漕粟于赵。赵籴十五,隰朋取之石五十。天下闻之,载粟而之齐。齐修械器十七月,修籴五月,即闭关不与衡山通使。燕、代、秦、赵即引其使而归。衡山械器尽,鲁削衡山之南,齐削衡山之北。内自量无械器以应二敌,即奉国而归齐矣。

大家看过《管子》原著的,难免失望,这正是管仲有生之年没有亲手梳理自己的治国原理而造成的不可避免的杯具。《管子》虽然可以提供大量的佐证,但是没有系统的理论,写得东一榔头西一棒槌。因此,阅读《管子》要有明确的目的,比如我今天要搞清楚春秋时代是否存在民间贷款与贷款利息,如存在,那么春秋时代的民间贷款利率是多少,抱着这样的问题去找,就能取得鲜活的资料丰富自己的知识,如此这般方才可读《管子》。

姜小白和管仲的梦幻组合,发明了很多的搜刮天下钱财的剧本。虽则是2700年前的旧事,但是,后世只是换了演员和道具,他俩的剧本仍然在被使用。

比如:戴比尔斯和英美集团垄断世界钻石矿,通过拉抬钻石的价格,搞全世界男人的钱。美国攻打中东,垄断石油价格,搜刮世界财富。这些伎俩,管仲和姜小白有专利。

垄断天下奇货,拉抬价格,搜刮天下财富的典型代表作是《菁茅之谋》和《阴里之谋》。

大家知道姜小白在管仲的策划下,用了二十年,终于取得了会盟天下诸侯的成功,就是成了霸主,但他这个霸主有些历史问题。

因为,宋国是公爵,齐国是侯爵。公侯伯子男,所以,作为盟主的齐桓公心里边有些虚,他得让大家伙儿承认,他这个侯爵,已经不是侯爵,而是超~~~级~~~侯爵,他得证明自己行。

如何证明自己与众不同呢?一天,姜小白对管仲说:“我TMD想明白了,我要搞运动!我必须带头掀起一场尊重周天子的运动,周天子穷的都快要饭了,我这么一尊重他,他能不感激我吗,我这招儿叫尊天子以令诸侯!我真TMD是天才!”管仲说:“天才个屌,你以为宋国想不到啊,关键是搞运动需要经费,谁出钱?”姜小白一听就萎了,原来就差钱。管仲说;“我有一阴招儿,不差钱,你这么这么,就成了”。

管仲让姜小白去“阴里”这个地方铸城,那里独家出产一种美石(类似玉),这种美石是古代周天子制造王室祭祀专用璧的材料,姜小白修了三层城墙、九个城门,把阴里城防工事整的跟铁桶一样。姜小白让玉工在里边制作好石璧存着,石璧做了五种,一尺大小的标注面值一万泉。八寸的标注8000泉。七寸的标注 7000。珪中标注4000。瑗中标注500。为什么做这么多种类呢?因为天下诸侯繁衍了几百年,越来越多,阿猫阿狗都自称是诸侯后裔,都惦着粘粘封号的光,周天子家族萧条,他们可是繁荣的不行。管仲做这么多石壁,就是要把他们一网打尽。

玉工做好了,管仲就去见周天子,说我家国君想搞尊周运动,号召天下诸侯齐来拜祭太庙,但是按照传统礼仪,必须带着彤弓和石璧觐见,否则不能进庙去,您可以批准么?周天子说:这次活动经费谁出?管仲说:我们齐国出。周天子说:快~~~去~~~~办!!!还愣着干什么!!!

天下诸侯都没有石璧,强抢又打不下阴里城,只好去买,结果天下诸侯的黄金被齐国搜刮无数,阴里的石璧倒是流通到了天下。这一次,齐国赚的钱多得八年都不用收税。

这就是阴里之谋

齐桓公赚足了钱,很同情周天子,对管仲说:周天子也没经费,天子没钱也是孙子,咱也得给天子弄钱啊。管仲说:这简单,天下江淮之间有一小块特殊的土地,独家出产一种茅草,这种茅草品种独特,每只都从根上长出三个分叉,这叫“菁茅”。这种茅是古代诸侯参与天子封禅大会必须的进门证,请周天子派人先把这块地圈起来,然后号令天下诸侯:周天子要带着大家去封禅泰山,梁父山,老规矩:不抱着一束菁茅的,不许进门。

周天子如此去办,结果,天下的黄金就开始象流水一样流入周天子的口袋,菁茅一束就被诸侯炒到了一百斤黄金。周天子太有钱了,七年都没有再要求诸侯进贡。

是为菁茅之谋

齐国在管仲的治理下,十分富强,汉族在齐国的带领下,诸侯团结,取得了对西狄和北戎战争的全面胜利(老马识途就是这场大战的事情),使北方游牧民族对中原的威胁得到全面抑制。否则,蒙古灭中华的事情,可能在2700年前就已经成为现实了,大家如果不信,可以听听孔丘说的:

一天,孔子跟子贡说:管仲辅齐桓公,国富民强,天下太平。我们中原人民直到今天还在享受着他俩留下的福祉。如果没有管子,我们今天早被蛮夷灭了,咱们都得学习野蛮人的丑陋发型,穿蛮族的丑陋衣服啊。(2000多年后的清朝,孔子的噩梦成真)

管子这样的人出生在中国,而不是外国,实在是我中国人的福分,中国如再有此类大才,何愁不国富民强。宋代大诗人李清照的爸爸李格非,一次路过临淄遗址,写下了《过临淄》:

击鼓吹竽七百年,

临淄城阙尚依然。

如今只有耕耘者,

曾得当时九府钱。

这首诗成于管子死后1700年,齐国都城城阙依然存在,农夫经常能够挖到姜子牙发行的九府环钱,齐国之盛,可见一斑。

言归正傳:这一篇我主要写姜小白和管仲以发动经济战争为手段,征服其他国家的过程。过程虽然残酷,但是,你会发现,齐桓公追求的最终结果,无非是树立齐国的权威,他们二人是从来没有幻想过篡改朝代的,鼓吹邪教杀人筑观的事情,更是没有干过。即使最后经济手段不灵了,去打打杀杀,也是点到为止,很有喜剧精神,对方一服软,这俩人马上就收兵,绝不革命。说的直白一点,他俩打仗都是带着女人去的,当然,不是女特种部队,而是货真价实,如假包换的美女。炮房就建在马车上,仗打到哪里,炮就打到哪里。

最为过分的是有一次,他俩去征服一个大国(好象是宋国记不清了),管打前站,姜殿后,管走了一个多礼拜还在齐国边境附近磨蹭呢(看这效率)。路边一农夫荷锄而歌,歌词管大才子居然听不懂!结果他被窝儿里的美女给他解释了。妞儿还鼓励管子启用这个农民,结果农民不负妞望,仅凭一只舌头,就把宋国君给弄服了(看人这口活!),咱能看出,管子泡的妞儿,那是什么学问,那是什么素质。也不难想象,管子打仗的献身精神(事实上,他打仗经常第一个闪人,为此鲍叔牙记了他一辈子)。

老姜和老管自己泡妞爽了,还不忘记父老兄弟,特意为齐国官兵设立了随军妓院,齐军待遇如此人性化,成为了当时世界上最文明的军队。(妓院\桑拿\洗头房应该供的祖师爷是管子,怎么供关公呢?)

扯远了,再扯就成黄色野史了,赶紧收回来。

齐国收服鲁国、莱莒、楚、代、衡山,均是以轻重之策催垮对手的经济。其中心思想,就是利用“天下下我高,天下轻我重”的阴谋原则,即将外国特产之国内价格抬高到比正常水平高的多的水准,使其变成单一经济,生产力配比畸形成长,然后突然改变国际贸易规则,全面破坏外国的财政收入,最终迫使其完全成为经济殖民地。

鲁国是齐国的第一个障碍物,两国近邻,热战各有胜负,从经济上催垮鲁国,成为必杀的绝招。让我们看看这个过程。

桓公说:我TMD看鲁国不顺眼很久了,很想搞定鲁国,可怎么办呢?管仲说:好办,你用鲁国特产的绨做衣服,你是齐国的天皇巨星啊,全国都追你,你下令齐国人不许自己织绨,必须买绨就行了。于是桓公就穿着绨做的衣服到处晃。全国人民都争相买鲁绨效仿。管仲让鲁国的商人把绨出口到齐国,一千匹价格三百斤黄金,一万匹三千斤。鲁国靠出口创汇赚了大钱,国家都不用对老百姓收税了,财政十分富裕。十三个月后,管派特务去鲁国侦察,发现鲁国的人民太忙了,国家太繁荣了,城市里交通堵车,人都得慢慢挪着走。管仲说:哼,鲁国完了。桓公问:我操,他们这么繁荣,怎么就完了?管子说:请您以后不要再穿绨,也不要让老百姓穿了,咱跟鲁国断交,你看看结果吧。十个月以后,管仲再次派特务去侦察,发现鲁国人饿死的很多,鲁国政府命令老百姓赶紧去把绨厂破产了改种粮食,但是,粮食三两个月根本长不成熟,鲁国粮食价格涨到了齐国的十倍。两年后,鲁国的老百姓60%都移民到齐国了,三年以后,鲁国投降了。

收拾莱国,用的是把莱国特产的柴抬高价格大肆进口,结果莱国为了出口创汇,荒废了农业,结果是两年后,莱国粮食价格是齐国的三十七倍,70%的莱国老百姓都移民到了齐国,莱国只有投降。

收拾楚国,是进口楚国的鹿,过程一模一样,楚国粮食因此贵了四十倍,楚国老百姓移民的40%,楚国也只有降了。

收拾代国,是进口代国特产的传说中的白色变异狐狸,代国最惨,一只都没出口,国家就破产了,据说管仲给进口这屌狐狸制定的价格,高的令代国国君都不上班,亲自出马进山逮狐狸去了,结果,黄的有的是,白的两年一只都没逮着,国家没粮食没军队(都进山当猎户去了),被速灭。

出口创汇,在春秋时代,很容易被姜小白和管仲忽悠成国家财政吸毒。

在今天,我们必须深思身边是不是也发生了类似的情形,只不过,表现形式更加复杂,表现过程更加漫长,国家间“天下下我高,天下轻我重”轻重之术的本质,确是亘古不变的真理,2500年后的GDP到底是不是2500年前的那只白狐狸,又有谁知道。 

管仲实在是太牛了,读通了《管子》之后,你就发现,美联储+美国政府,今天做的事情,都是在copy咱的祖先而已。只可惜我们自己守着这么一座大金山,却没有学好,这是多么让人悲哀的一件事情啊!

Is China more legitimate than the West?

The point of author is that the legitimacy of China government is that China is one civilization of one state while the Western country is one nation of many states.


Is China more legitimate than the West?

2 November 2012 Last updated at 13:48 ET Martin Jacques

Is China more legitimate than the West [1]

China and the United States are about to choose new leaders via very different methods. But is a candidate voted for by millions a more legitimate choice than one anointed by a select few, asks Martin Jacques.

This week will witness an extraordinary juxtaposition of events. On Tuesday the next American president will be elected. Two days later, the 18th congress of the Chinese Communist Party will select the new Chinese president and prime minister.

The contrast could hardly be greater.

Americans in their tens of millions will turn out to vote. In China the process of selection will take place behind closed doors and involve only a relative handful of people.

You are probably thinking, “Ah, America at its best, China at its worst – the absence of democracy. China’s Achilles heel is its governance. This will be China’s downfall.”

I want to argue quite the contrary.

You probably think that the legitimacy and authority of the state, or government, is overwhelmingly a function of democracy, Western-style.

But democracy is only one factor. Nor does democracy in itself guarantee legitimacy.

Think of Italy. It is always voting, but the enduring problem of Italian governance is that its state lacks legitimacy. Half the population don’t really believe in it.

Now let me shock you: the Chinese state enjoys greater legitimacy than any Western state. How come?

In China’s case the source of the state’s legitimacy lies entirely outside the history or experience of Western societies.

In my first talk I explained that China is not primarily a nation-state but a civilisation-state. For the Chinese, what matters is civilisation. For Westerners it is nation. The most important political value in China is the integrity and unity of the civilisation-state.

Given the sheer size and diversity of the country, this is hugely problematic. Between the 1840s and 1949, China was occupied by the colonial powers, divided and fragmented. The Chinese refer to it as their century of humiliation.

They see the state as the embodiment and guardian of Chinese civilisation. Its most important responsibility – bar none – is maintaining the unity of the country. A government that fails to ensure this will fall.

There have been many examples in history. The legitimacy of the Chinese state lies, above all, in its relationship with Chinese civilisation.

But does the Chinese state, you may well ask, really enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its people?

Take the findings of Tony Saich at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. In a series of surveys he found that between 80 and 95% of Chinese people were either relatively or extremely satisfied with central government.

Is China more legitimate than the West [2]
Chinese people say they are happy with their government’s economic record

Or take the highly respected Pew Global Attitudes surveys which found in 2010, for example, that 91% of Chinese respondents thought that the government’s handling of the economy was good (the UK figure, incidentally was 45%).

Such high levels of satisfaction do not mean that China is conflict-free.

On the contrary, there are countless examples of protest action, such as the wave of strikes in Guangdong province for higher wages in 2010 and 2011, and the 150,000 or more so-called mass incidents that take place every year – generally protests by farmers against what they see as the illegal seizure of their land by local authorities in cahoots with property developers.

But these actions do not imply any fundamental dissatisfaction with central government.

If the Chinese state enjoys such support, then why does it display such signs of paranoia? The controls on the press and the internet, the periodic arrest of dissidents, and the rest of it.

Good point. Actually, all Chinese governments have displayed these same symptoms. Why?

Because the country is huge and governance is extremely difficult. They are always anxious, always fearing the unforeseen. Anticipating sources of instability has long been regarded as a fundamental attribute of good governance.

Not surprisingly, the Chinese have a quite different attitude towards government to that universal in the West.

True, our attitude depends in part on where we stand on the political spectrum. If you are on the right, you are likely to believe in less government and more market. If you are on the left, you are likely to be more favourably disposed to the state.

But both left and right share certain basic assumptions. The role of the state should be codified in law, there should be clear limits to its powers, and there are many areas in which the state should not be involved. We believe the state is necessary – but only up to a point.

The Chinese idea of the state could hardly be more different.

The Chinese see the state as a member of the family – the head of the family, in fact

They do not view it from a narrowly utilitarian standpoint, in terms of what it can deliver, let alone as the devil incarnate in the manner of the American Tea Party.

They see the state as an intimate, or, to be more precise, as a member of the family – the head of the family, in fact. The Chinese regard the family as the template for the state. What’s more, they perceive the state not as external to themselves but as an extension or representation of themselves.

The fact that the Chinese state enjoys such an exalted position in society lends it enormous authority, a remarkable ubiquity and great competence.

Take the economy. China’s economic rise – an annual growth rate of 10% for more than 30 years – has been masterminded by the Chinese state.

It is the most remarkable economic transformation the world has seen since the modern era began with Britain’s industrial revolution in the late 18th Century.

Even though China is still a poor developing country, its state, I would argue, is the most competent in the world.

Take infrastructure – the importance of which is belatedly now being recognised in the West. Here, China has no peers. Its high speed rail network is the world’s largest and will soon be greater than the rest of the world’s put together.

And the state’s ubiquity – a large majority of China’s most competitive companies, to this day, are state-owned. Or consider the one-child policy, which still commands great support amongst the population.

The competence of the state is little talked about or really valued in the West, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world.

Indeed, since the early 80s, the debate about the state in Britain has largely been conducted in terms either of what bits should be privatised or how it can be made to mimic the market.

Now, however, we are in a new ball game. With the Western economies in a profound mess and with China’s startling rise, the competence of the state can no longer be ignored. Our model is in crisis. Theirs has been delivering the goods.

As China’s dramatic ascent continues – which it surely will – then China’s strengths will become a growing subject of interest in the West. We will realise that our relationship with them can no longer consist of telling them how they should be like us. A little humility is in order.

One of the most dramatic illustrations of this will be the state. We think of it as their greatest weakness but we will come to realise that it is one of their greatest strengths.

Beyond a point it would be quite impossible for a Western state to be like China’s. It is the product of a different history and a different relationship between state and society. You could never transplant their state into a Western country, and vice versa. But this does not mean that we cannot learn from the Chinese state, just as they have learnt much from us.

China’s rise will have a profound effect on Western debate.

Is China more legitimate than the West [3]
The Chinese economy is set to overtake the US in 2018

In about six years hence, the Chinese economy will overtake the US economy in size. By 2030 it will be very much larger.

The world is increasingly being shaped by China, and if it has looked west for the last two centuries, in future it will look east.

Welcome, then, to the new Chinese paradigm – one that combines a highly competitive, indeed often ferocious market, with a ubiquitous and competent state.

For us in the West this is an entirely new phenomenon. And it will shape our future.

How would you describe the tensions in Tibet and Western China? It would appear that the indigenous populations there don’t seem to want to be part of the Chinese State?

Sean Halliday, Duqm Oman

The time-frame may be lengthy, but history tell us that all totalitarian states eventually fail. Additionally, extensive gaps between rich and poor create social unrest which, in China may be on an epic scale. The Chinese state may implode on itself.

Michael, Kendal UK

Martin’s viewpoint is absolutely spot on. Essdentially, the West is a fragmented units with different lifestyles (nation)held together by representatives of the units to form an entity (the state) legitimated by election of its representatives. Whereas China is a one unit with one lifestyle (a civilisation) held together by an entity (the state) legitimated by selection of its deemed solial leaders accross the civilisation. Legitimacy of the state is not only the Western form but any form that represents the people. I believe that calls for re-assessment of the concept of democracy itself.

Jesse Ofirikyi, London

You cannot really compare the Western & Chinese approaches to modern goverment without looking at how they have evolved hostorically. In most Western countries the autocratic approach to rule (one all-powerful ruler) evolved over several centuries to a democratic approach, although not without a few bumps on the way. As a consequence of this Western citizens are conditioned to the democratic approach, and tend to reject anything that smacks of dictatorship. China however has several thousand years of autocratic rule via the Emperors which was eventually overthrown and replaced by the autocratic and self-sustaining rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Hence Chinese citizens have never had any taste of true democracy; at best what democracy they have been allowed to experience has been carefully cleansed of any possible threat to the ruling hegamony.

Alan Hughes, Alton, Hampshire

Your premise has one great unstated assumption — that the Chinese central government will always get it right (given some of their past mistakes, can you trust this assumption?). It is relatively obvious how to develop an underdeveloped economy as so much infrastructure is required. The real challenge will come when the economy becomes highly sophisticated. Then governments have a much harder time making the right decisions to allocate resources and capital. I would hold out Japan as an example — in the 1970s and up to the 1980s everybody was in awe its industrial policy. And then it stopped working. The smooth assent of China is not guaranteed.

R Piller, Geneva, Switzerland

It is interesting to hear you conceptualise China as a civilisation rather than a nation. Chinese are rightly proud of their state and its rise as a global power but for me it is a country of contradictions. Literacy, opportunity, the hegemony of the Han Chinese, the widening gap between rich and poor (also an issue in western countries) will all be significant issues in the future and the difference between haves and have-nots seems like it may be a problem in a society that is supposed to be communist. I think of China as a teenager struggling to come to grips with its own identity.and its future may not be as clear as some people may think.

Tom, Shanghai, China

I hear that North Korea’s government also enjoys wide support and therefore legitimacy. This article is missing a distinction between “legitimacy” and support from a society that is relatively disenfranchised from the global pool of knowledge.

Victor Duncan, Beijing, China

Thatcher was right – there is no ‘society’

Perhaps the EU needs a “Thatcher” to solve the problem of PIGS.


Thatcher was right – there is no ‘society’

Date here Samuel Brittan

Now that both the obsequies and the ritual condemnations of Margaret Thatcher are over, the time has begun for a more analytical look at her legacy. I am not a bad person to start this off as I was neither a passionate anti-Thatcherite nor regarded by her inner circle as “really one of us”.

A point that has been missed in all the verbiage of recent days is how much her thinking owed to Keith Joseph, the Conservative who helped to put the idea of a genuine free market back on the political agenda.

In saying this I am far from trying to detract from her legacy. On the contrary, she often said: “One day people will realise what they owe to Keith Joseph.” Anyone can confirm this by looking at her Joseph Memorial Lecture of 1996 given to the Centre for Policy Studies. The first part of the lecture, on the connection between a free economy and a free society, and the last part, on the perils of the euro currency project, are still fresh and relevant.

I should like to start with a comment she made that has defined her – it was even raised at her funeral. Some see it as one of the worst things that she said; I regard it as one of the best.

“I think we have been through a period when too many people have been given to understand that when they have a problem it is government’s job to cope with it. ‘I have a problem, I’ll get a grant. I’m homeless, the government must house me.’ They are casting their problems on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And no governments can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours. People have got their entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There is no such thing as an entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation.”

Thatcher meant, I believe, that people should first try to solve their own problems and those of their families and friends, and only as a last resort rely on government. The government is simply a mechanism with which people can help each other and force would-be free riders to make a contribution. I interpreted her remarks as an expression of methodological individualism (although I pity any speech writer who sought to persuade her to say those words).

I have tried to explain all this in my book Capitalism With a Human Face. Very briefly it means that the workings of complex wholes must be capable of being expressed in terms of individual components – chemical elements in terms of atoms, atoms in terms of subatomic particles and nations in terms of their citizens. Methodological individualism has been espoused by a long line of empiricist thinkers, some of very different politics to Thatcher.

The classical liberal philosopher Karl Popper, for instance, looked at the abstract concept of war. “What is concrete is the many who are killed, or the men and women in uniform.” The 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume remarked that a nation was a collection of individuals. This doctrine has also been denied by many supposedly eminent philosophers, such as the overrated G.W.F. Hegel, who said: “All the worth which the human being possesses in all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the state.”

Thatcher was well aware that the support she has been accused of withholding from declining industries in the north of the UK would have come not from a mysterious entity known as the state. It would have come from fellow citizens. She may have been right or wrong. But it was not a matter of her personal generosity. Nit-picking political philosophers have said that if she wanted to be a true methodological individualist she would not have added “and there are families” in her famous statement. It was like saying: “There are no forests, only trees and copses.” She was not so stupid as to fail to see this. But she was not teaching a political philosophy class. She was pointing out that aid for the poor, or distressed regions, had to come from somewhere – namely the inhabitants of the country concerned.

It was a pity that she was incapable of applying this reductionist thinking to foreign affairs. There are no beings such as Germany, Britain or Argentina – only complex entities composed of individuals. It is reasonable for a British citizen to value a British life more than an Argentine life, but it is unreasonable to put a zero value on the latter. It must be admitted that even if people habitually thought in these terms they might still support death as a necessary evil to avoid territorial losses and the like. But if this translation were always made it might sometimes lead to less nationalist policies. Even Thatcher must have been intuitively aware of this when she wept for 40 minutes at the loss of life when a battleship went down near the Falklands.

The End of the University as We Know It

tl; just skim.

After an exhausting reading experience, I sadly found I cannot be convinced by those points which the author have made.

The outline is clear. It is marked up by those drop caps that leads a new section.

I guess the word of “University” actually has a specific meaning in this article. It’s more or less like a business model. The model may change, just like a company may change its strategy based on the market circumstance. Therefore, this specific “University” that the author referred may end, but, from a general definition, the university will still last long.


The End of the University as We Know It

From the January/February 2013 issue Nathan Harden (The American Interest)

The End of the University as We Know It [1]

In fifty years, if not much sooner, half of the roughly 4,500 colleges and universities now operating in the United States will have ceased to exist. The technology driving this change is already at work, and nothing can stop it. The future looks like this: Access to college-level education will be free for everyone; the residential college campus will become largely obsolete; tens of thousands of professors will lose their jobs; the bachelor’s degree will become increasingly irrelevant; and ten years from now Harvard will enroll ten million students.

We’ve all heard plenty about the “college bubble” in recent years. Student loan debt is at an all-time high—an average of more than $23,000 per graduate by some counts—and tuition costs continue to rise at a rate far outpacing inflation, as they have for decades. Credential inflation is devaluing the college degree, making graduate degrees, and the greater debt required to pay for them, increasingly necessary for many people to maintain the standard of living they experienced growing up in their parents’ homes. Students are defaulting on their loans at an unprecedented rate, too, partly a function of an economy short on entry-level professional positions. Yet, as with all bubbles, there’s a persistent public belief in the value of something, and that faith in the college degree has kept demand high.

The figures are alarming, the anecdotes downright depressing. But the real story of the American higher-education bubble has little to do with individual students and their debts or employment problems. The most important part of the college bubble story—the one we will soon be hearing much more about—concerns the impending financial collapse of numerous private colleges and universities and the likely shrinkage of many public ones. And when that bubble bursts, it will end a system of higher education that, for all of its history, has been steeped in a culture of exclusivity. Then we’ll see the birth of something entirely new as we accept one central and unavoidable fact: The college classroom is about to go virtual.

W

e are all aware that the IT revolution is having an impact on education, but we tend to appreciate the changes in isolation, and at the margins. Very few have been able to exercise their imaginations to the point that they can perceive the systemic and structural changes ahead, and what they portend for the business models and social scripts that sustain the status quo. That is partly because the changes are threatening to many vested interests, but also partly because the human mind resists surrender to upheaval and the anxiety that tends to go with it. But resist or not, major change is coming. The live lecture will be replaced by streaming video. The administration of exams and exchange of coursework over the internet will become the norm. The push and pull of academic exchange will take place mainly in interactive online spaces, occupied by a new generation of tablet-toting, hyper-connected youth who already spend much of their lives online. Universities will extend their reach to students around the world, unbounded by geography or even by time zones. All of this will be on offer, too, at a fraction of the cost of a traditional college education.

How do I know this will happen? Because recent history shows us that the internet is a great destroyer of any traditional business that relies on the sale of information. The internet destroyed the livelihoods of traditional stock brokers and bonds salesmen by throwing open to everyone access to the proprietary information they used to sell. The same technology enabled bankers and financiers to develop new products and methods, but, as it turned out, the experience necessary to manage it all did not keep up. Prior to the Wall Street meltdown, it seemed absurd to think that storied financial institutions like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers could disappear seemingly overnight. Until it happened, almost no one believed such a thing was possible. Well, get ready to see the same thing happen to a university near you, and not for entirely dissimilar reasons.

The higher-ed business is in for a lot of pain as a new era of creative destruction produces a merciless shakeout of those institutions that adapt and prosper from those that stall and die. Meanwhile, students themselves are in for a golden age, characterized by near-universal access to the highest quality teaching and scholarship at a minimal cost. The changes ahead will ultimately bring about the most beneficial, most efficient and most equitable access to education that the world has ever seen. There is much to be gained. We may lose the gothic arches, the bespectacled lecturers, dusty books lining the walls of labyrinthine libraries—wonderful images from higher education’s past. But nostalgia won’t stop the unsentimental beast of progress from wreaking havoc on old ways of doing things. If a faster, cheaper way of sharing information emerges, history shows us that it will quickly supplant what came before. People will not continue to pay tens of thousands of dollars for what technology allows them to get for free.

Technology will also bring future students an array of new choices about how to build and customize their educations. Power is shifting away from selective university admissions officers into the hands of educational consumers, who will soon have their choice of attending virtually any university in the world online. This will dramatically increase competition among universities. Prestigious institutions, especially those few extremely well-endowed ones with money to buffer and finance change, will be in a position to dominate this virtual, global educational marketplace. The bottom feeders—the for-profit colleges and low-level public and non-profit colleges—will disappear or turn into the equivalent of vocational training institutes. Universities of all ranks below the very top will engage each other in an all-out war of survival. In this war, big-budget universities carrying large transactional costs stand to lose the most. Smaller, more nimble institutions with sound leadership will do best.

T

his past spring, Harvard and MIT got the attention of everyone in the higher ed business when they announced a new online education venture called edX. The new venture will make online versions of the universities’ courses available to a virtually unlimited number of enrollees around the world. Think of the ramifications: Now anyone in the world with an internet connection can access the kind of high-level teaching and scholarship previously available only to a select group of the best and most privileged students. It’s all part of a new breed of online courses known as “massive open online courses” (MOOCs), which are poised to forever change the way students learn and universities teach.

One of the biggest barriers to the mainstreaming of online education is the common assumption that students don’t learn as well with computer-based instruction as they do with in-person instruction. There’s nothing like the personal touch of being in a classroom with an actual professor, says the conventional wisdom, and that’s true to some extent. Clearly, online education can’t be superior in all respects to the in-person experience. Nor is there any point pretending that information is the same as knowledge, and that access to information is the same as the teaching function instrumental to turning the former into the latter. But researchers at Carnegie Mellon’s Open Learning Initiative, who’ve been experimenting with computer-based learning for years, have found that when machine-guided learning is combined with traditional classroom instruction, students can learn material in half the time. Researchers at Ithaka S+R studied two groups of students—one group that received all instruction in person, and another group that received a mixture of traditional and computer-based instruction. The two groups did equally well on tests, but those who received the computer instruction were able to learn the same amount of material in 25 percent less time.

The real value of MOOCs is their scalability. Andrew Ng, a Stanford computer science professor and co-founder of an open-source web platform called Coursera (a for-profit version of edX), got into the MOOC business after he discovered that thousands of people were following his free Stanford courses online. He wanted to capitalize on the intense demand for high-quality, open-source online courses. A normal class Ng teaches at Stanford might enroll, at most, several hundred students. But in the fall of 2011 his online course in machine learning enrolled 100,000. “To reach that many students before”, Ng explained to Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, “I would have had to teach my normal Stanford class for 250 years.”

Based on the popularity of the MOOC offerings online so far, we know that open-source courses at elite universities have the potential to serve enormous “classes.” An early MIT online course called “Circuits and Electronics” has attracted 120,000 registrants. Top schools like Yale, MIT and Stanford have been making streaming videos and podcasts of their courses available online for years, but MOOCs go beyond this to offer a full-blown interactive experience. Students can intermingle with faculty and with each other over a kind of higher-ed social network. Streaming lectures may be accompanied by short auto-graded quizzes. Students can post questions about course material to discuss with other students. These discussions unfold across time zones, 24 hours a day. In extremely large courses, students can vote questions up or down, so that the best questions rise to the top. It’s like an educational amalgam of YouTube, Wikipedia and Facebook.

Among the chattering classes in higher ed, there is an increasing sense that we have reached a tipping point where new interactive web technology, coupled with widespread access to broadband internet service and increased student comfort interacting online, will send online education mainstream. It’s easy to forget that only ten years ago Facebook didn’t exist. Teens now approaching college age are members of the first generation to have grown up conducting a major part of their social lives online. They are prepared to engage with professors and students online in a way their predecessors weren’t, and as time passes more and more professors are comfortable with the technology, too.

In the future, the primary platform for higher education may be a third-party website, not the university itself. What is emerging is a global marketplace where courses from numerous universities are available on a single website. Students can pick and choose the best offerings from each school; the university simply uploads the content. Coursera, for example, has formed agreements with Penn, Princeton, UC Berkeley, and the University of Michigan to manage these schools’ forays into online education. On the non-profit side, MIT has been the nation’s leader in pioneering open-source online education through its MITx platform, which launched last December and serves as the basis for the new edX platform.

H

old on there a minute, you might object. Just as information is not the same as knowledge, and auto-access is not necessarily auto-didactics, so taking a bunch of random courses does not a coherent university education make. Mere exposure, too, doesn’t guarantee that knowledge has been learned. In other words, what about the justifiable function of majors and credentials?

MIT is the first elite university to offer a credential for students who complete its free, open-source online courses. (The certificate of completion requires a small fee.) For the first time, students can do more than simply watch free lectures; they can gain a marketable credential—something that could help secure a raise or a better job. While edX won’t offer traditional academic credits, Harvard and MIT have announced that “certificates of mastery” will be available for those who complete the online courses and can demonstrate knowledge of course material. The arrival of credentials, backed by respected universities, eliminates one of the last remaining obstacles to the widespread adoption of low-cost online education. Since edX is open source, Harvard and MIT expect other universities to adopt the same platform and contribute their own courses. And the two universities have put $60 million of their own money behind the project, making edX the most promising MOOC venture out there right now.

Anant Agarwal, an MIT computer science professor and edX’s first president, told the Los Angeles Times, “MIT’s and Harvard’s mission is to provide affordable education to anybody who wants it.” That’s a very different mission than elite schools like Harvard and MIT have had for most of their existence. These schools have long focused on educating the elite—the smartest and, often, the wealthiest students in the world. But Agarwal’s statement is an indication that, at some level, these institutions realize that the scalability and economic efficiency of online education allow for a new kind of mission for elite universities. Online education is forcing elite schools to re-examine their priorities. In the future, they will educate the masses as well as the select few. The leaders of Harvard and MIT have founded edX, undoubtedly, because they realize that these changes are afoot, even if they may not yet grasp just how profound those changes will be.

And what about the social experience that is so important to college? Students can learn as much from their peers in informal settings as they do from their professors in formal ones. After college, networking with fellow alumni can lead to valuable career opportunities. Perhaps that is why, after the launch of edX, the presidents of both Harvard and MIT emphasized that their focus would remain on the traditional residential experience. “Online education is not an enemy of residential education”, said MIT president Susan Hockfield.

Yet Hockfield’s statement doesn’t hold true for most less wealthy universities. Harvard and MIT’s multi-billion dollar endowments enable them to support a residential college system alongside the virtually free online platforms of the future, but for other universities online education poses a real threat to the residential model. Why, after all, would someone pay tens of thousands of dollars to attend Nowhere State University when he or she can attend an online version of MIT or Harvard practically for free?

This is why those middle-tier universities that have spent the past few decades spending tens or even hundreds of millions to offer students the Disneyland for Geeks experience are going to find themselves in real trouble. Along with luxury dorms and dining halls, vast athletic facilities, state of the art game rooms, theaters and student centers have come layers of staff and non-teaching administrators, all of which drives up the cost of the college degree without enhancing student learning. The biggest mistake a non-ultra-elite university could make today is to spend lavishly to expand its physical space. Buying large swaths of land and erecting vast new buildings is an investment in the past, not the future. Smart universities should be investing in online technology and positioning themselves as leaders in the new frontier of open-source education. Creating the world’s premier, credentialed open online education platform would be a major achievement for any university, and it would probably cost much less than building a new luxury dorm.

Even some elite universities may find themselves in trouble in this regard, despite their capacity, as noted, to retain the residential norm. In 2007 Princeton completed construction on a new $136 million luxury dormitory for its students—all part of an effort to expand its undergraduate enrollment. Last year Yale finalized plans to build new residential dormitories at a combined cost of $600 million. The expansion will increase the size of Yale’s undergraduate population by about 1,000. The project is so expensive that Yale could actually buy a three-bedroom home in New Haven for every new student it is bringing in and still save $100 million. In New York City, Columbia stirred up controversy by seizing entire blocks of Harlem by force of eminent domain for a project with a $6.3 billion price tag. Not to be outdone, Columbia’s downtown neighbor, NYU, announced plans to buy up six million square feet of debt-leveraged space in one of the most expensive real estate markets in the world, at an estimated cost of $6 billion. The University of Pennsylvania has for years been expanding all over West Philadelphia like an amoeba gone real-estate insane. What these universities are doing is pure folly, akin to building a compact disc factory in the late 1990s. They are investing in a model that is on its way to obsolescence. If these universities understood the changes that lie ahead, they would be selling off real estate, not buying it—unless they prefer being landlords to being educators.

Now, because the demand for college degrees is so high (whether for good reasons or not is not the question for the moment), and because students and the parents who love them are willing to take on massive debt in order to obtain those degrees, and because the government has been eager to make student loans easier to come by, these universities and others have, so far, been able to keep on building and raising prices. But what happens when a limited supply of a sought-after commodity suddenly becomes unlimited? Prices fall. Yet here, on the cusp of a new era of online education, that is a financial reality that few American universities are prepared to face.

The era of online education presents universities with a conflict of interests—the goal of educating the public on one hand, and the goal of making money on the other. As Burck Smith, CEO of the distance-learning company StraighterLine, has written, universities have “a public-sector mandate” but “a private-sector business model.” In other words, raising revenues often trumps the interests of students. Most universities charge as much for their online courses as they do for their traditional classroom courses. They treat the savings of online education as a way to boost profit margins; they don’t pass those savings along to students.

One potential source of cost savings for lower-rung colleges would be to draw from open-source courses offered by elite universities. Community colleges, for instance, could effectively outsource many of their courses via MOOCs, becoming, in effect, partial downstream aggregators of others’ creations, more or less like newspapers have used wire services to make up for a decline in the number of reporters. They could then serve more students with fewer faculty, saving money for themselves and students. At a time when many public universities are facing stiff budget cuts and families are struggling to pay for their kids’ educations, open-source online education looks like a promising way to reduce costs and increase the quality of instruction. Unfortunately, few college administrators are keen on slashing budgets, downsizing departments or taking other difficult steps to reduce costs. The past thirty years of constant tuition hikes at U.S. universities has shown us that much.

The biggest obstacle to the rapid adoption of low-cost, open-source education in America is that many of the stakeholders make a very handsome living off the system as is. In 2009, 36 college presidents made more than $1 million. That’s in the middle of a recession, when most campuses were facing severe budget cuts. This makes them rather conservative when it comes to the politics of higher education, in sharp contrast to their usual leftwing political bias in other areas. Reforming themselves out of business by rushing to provide low- and middle-income students credentials for free via open-source courses must be the last thing on those presidents’ minds.

Nevertheless, competitive online offerings from other schools will eventually force these “non-profit” institutions to embrace the online model, even if the public interest alone won’t. And state governments will put pressure on public institutions to adopt the new open-source model, once politicians become aware of the comparable quality, broad access and low cost it offers.

C

onsidering the greater interactivity and global connectivity that future technology will afford, the gap between the online experience and the in-person experience will continue to close. For a long time now, the largest division within Harvard University has been the little-known Harvard Extension School, a degree-granting division within the Faculty of Arts and Sciences with minimal admissions standards and very low tuition that currently enrolls 13,000 students. The Extension School was founded for the egalitarian purpose of making the Harvard education available to the masses. Nevertheless, Harvard took measures to protect the exclusivity of its brand. The undergraduate degrees offered by the Extension School (Bachelor of Liberal Arts) are distinguished by name from the degrees the university awards through Harvard College (Bachelor of Arts). This model—one university, two types of degrees—offers a good template for Harvard’s future, in which the old residential college model will operate parallel to the new online open-source model. The Extension School already offers more than 200 online courses for full academic credit.

Prestigious private institutions and flagship public universities will thrive in the open-source market, where students will be drawn to the schools with bigger names. This means, paradoxically, that prestigious universities, which will have the easiest time holding on to the old residential model, also have the most to gain under the new model. Elite universities that are among the first to offer robust academic programs online, with real credentials behind them, will be the winners in the coming higher-ed revolution.

There is, of course, the question of prestige, which implies selectivity. It’s the primary way elite universities have distinguished themselves in the past. The harder it is to get in, the more prestigious a university appears. But limiting admissions to a select few makes little sense in the world of online education, where enrollment is no longer bounded by the number of seats in a classroom or the number of available dorm rooms. In the online world, the only concern is having enough faculty and staff on hand to review essays, or grade the tests that aren’t automated, or to answer questions and monitor student progress online.

Certain valuable experiences will be lost in this new online era, as already noted. My own experience at Yale furnishes some specifics. Through its “Open Yale” initiative, Yale has been recording its lecture courses for several years now, making them available to the public free of charge. Anyone with an internet connection can go online and watch some of the same lectures I attended as a Yale undergrad. But that person won’t get the social life, the long chats in the dinning hall, the feeling of collegiality, the trips around Long Island sound with the sailing team, the concerts, the iron-sharpens-iron debates around the seminar table, the rare book library, or the famous guest lecturers (although some of those events are streamed online, too). On the other hand, you can watch me and my fellow students take the stage to demonstrate a Hoplite phalanx in Donald Kagan’s class on ancient Greek history. You can take a virtual seat next to me in one of Giuseppe Mazzota’s unforgettable lectures on The Divine Comedy.

So while it can never duplicate the experience of a student with the good fortune to get into Yale, this is an historically significant development. Anyone who can access the internet—at a public library, for instance—no matter how poor or disadvantaged or isolated or uneducated he or she may be, can access the teachings of some of the greatest scholars of our time through open course portals. Technology is a great equalizer. Not everyone is willing or capable of taking advantage of these kinds of resources, but for those who are, the opportunity is there. As a society, we are experiencing a broadening of access to education equal in significance to the invention of the printing press, the public library or the public school.

O

nline education is like using online dating websites—fifteen years ago it was considered a poor substitute for the real thing, even creepy; now it’s ubiquitous. Online education used to have a stigma, as if it were inherently less rigorous or less effective. Eventually for-profit colleges and public universities, which had less to lose in terms of snob appeal, led the charge in bringing online education into the mainstream. It’s very common today for public universities to offer a menu of online courses to supplement traditional courses. Students can be enrolled in both types of courses simultaneously, and can sometimes even be enrolled in traditional classes at one university while taking an online course at another.

The open-source marketplace promises to offer students additional choices in the way they build their credentials. Colleges have long placed numerous restrictions on the number of credits a student can transfer in from an outside institution. In many cases, these restrictions appear useful for little more than protecting the university’s bottom line. The open-source model will offer much more flexibility, though still maintain the structure of a major en route to obtaining a credential. Students who aren’t interested in pursuing a traditional four-year degree, or in having any major at all, will be able to earn meaningful credentials one class at a time.

To borrow an analogy from the music industry, universities have previously sold education in an “album” package—the four-year bachelor’s degree in a certain major, usually coupled with a core curriculum. The trend for the future will be more compact, targeted educational certificates and credits, which students will be able to pick and choose from to create their own academic portfolios. Take a math class from MIT, an engineering class from Purdue, perhaps with a course in environmental law from Yale, and create interdisciplinary education targeted to one’s own interests and career goals. Employers will be able to identify students who have done well in specific courses that match their needs. When people submit résumés to potential employers, they could include a list of these individual courses, and their achievement in them, rather than simply reference a degree and overall GPA. The legitimacy of MOOCs in the eyes of employers will grow, then, as respected universities take the lead in offering open courses with meaningful credentials.

MOOCs will also be a great remedy to the increasing need for continuing education. It’s worth noting that while the four-year residential experience is what many of us picture when we think of “college”, the residential college experience has already become an experience only a minority of the nation’s students enjoy. Adult returning students now make up a large mass of those attending university. Non-traditional students make up 40 percent of all college students. Together with commuting students, or others taking classes online, they show that the traditional residential college experience is something many students either can’t afford or don’t want. The for-profit colleges, which often cater to working adult students with a combination of night and weekend classes and online coursework, have tapped into the massive demand for practical and customized education. It’s a sign of what is to come.

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hat about the destruction these changes will cause? Think again of the music industry analogy. Today, when you drive down music row in Nashville, a street formerly dominated by the offices of record labels and music publishing companies, you see a lot of empty buildings and rental signs. The contraction in the music industry has been relentless since the Mp3 and the iPod emerged. This isn’t just because piracy is easier now; it’s also because consumers have been given, for the first time, the opportunity to break the album down into individual songs. They can purchase the one or two songs they want and leave the rest. Higher education is about to become like that.

For nearly a thousand years the university system has looked just about the same: professors, classrooms, students in chairs. The lecture and the library have been at the center of it all. At its best, traditional classroom education offers the chance for intelligent and enthusiastic students to engage a professor and one another in debate and dialogue. But typical American college education rarely lives up to this ideal. Deep engagement with texts and passionate learning aren’t the prevailing characteristics of most college classrooms today anyway. More common are grade inflation, poor student discipline, and apathetic teachers rubber-stamping students just to keep them paying tuition for one more term.

If you ask students what they value most about the residential college experience, they’ll often speak of the unique social experience it provides: the chance to live among one’s peers and practice being independent in a sheltered environment, where many of life’s daily necessities like cooking and cleaning are taken care of. It’s not unlike what summer camp does at an earlier age. For some, college offers the chance to form meaningful friendships and explore unique extracurricular activities. Then, of course, there are the Animal House parties and hookups, which do take their toll: In their research for their book Academically Adrift, Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa found that 45 percent of the students they surveyed said they had no significant gains in knowledge after two years of college. Consider the possibility that, for the average student, traditional in-classroom university education has proven so ineffective that an online setting could scarcely be worse. But to recognize that would require unvarnished honesty about the present state of play. That’s highly unlikely, especially coming from present university incumbents.

The open-source educational marketplace will give everyone access to the best universities in the world. This will inevitably spell disaster for colleges and universities that are perceived as second rate. Likewise, the most popular professors will enjoy massive influence as they teach vast global courses with registrants numbering in the hundreds of thousands (even though “most popular” may well equate to most entertaining rather than to most rigorous). Meanwhile, professors who are less popular, even if they are better but more demanding instructors, will be squeezed out. Fair or not, a reduction in the number of faculty needed to teach the world’s students will result. For this reason, pursuing a Ph.D. in the liberal arts is one of the riskiest career moves one could make today. Because much of the teaching work can be scaled, automated or even duplicated by recording and replaying the same lecture over and over again on video, demand for instructors will decline.

Who, then, will do all the research that we rely on universities to do if campuses shrink and the number of full-time faculty diminishes? And how will important research be funded? The news here is not necessarily bad, either: Large numbers of very intelligent and well-trained people may be freed up from teaching to do more of their own research and writing. A lot of top-notch research scientists and mathematicians are terrible teachers anyway. Grant-givers and universities with large endowments will bear a special responsibility to make sure important research continues, but the new environment in higher ed should actually help them to do that. Clearly some kinds of education, such as training heart surgeons, will always require a significant amount of in-person instruction.

Big changes are coming, and old attitudes and business models are set to collapse as new ones rise. Few who will be affected by the changes ahead are aware of what’s coming. Severe financial contraction in the higher-ed industry is on the way, and for many this will spell hard times both financially and personally. But if our goal is educating as many students as possible, as well as possible, as affordably as possible, then the end of the university as we know it is nothing to fear. Indeed, it’s something to celebrate.

SQL: JOIN vs IN vs EXISTS – the Logical difference

原来 pre tag 也可以加style。

结论就是,只用Exists好了。

倒没说 left join 的问题。


SQL Server: JOIN vs IN vs EXISTS – the logical difference

Monday, March 18, 2013 I want some Moore

We’ve all written a CASE expression (yes, it’s an expression and not a statement) or two every now and then. But did you know there are actually 2 formats you can write the CASE expression in? This actually bit me when I was trying to add some new functionality to an old stored procedure. In some rare cases the stored procedure just didn’t work correctly. After a quick look it turned out to be a CASE expression problem when dealing with NULLS.

In the first format we make simple “equals to” comparisons to a value:

SELECT CASE <value>
WHEN <equals this value> THEN <return this>

WHEN <equals this value> THEN <return this>
-- ... more WHEN's here
ELSE <return this>
END

Second format is much more flexible since it allows for complex conditions. USE THIS ONE!

SELECT  CASE
WHEN <value> <compared to> <value> THEN <return this>
WHEN <value> <compared to> <value> THEN <return this>
-- ... more WHEN's here
ELSE <return this>
END

Now that we know both formats and you know which to use (the second one if that hasn’t been clear enough) here’s an example how the first format WILL make your evaluation logic WRONG.

Run the following code for different values of @i. Just comment out any 2 out of 3 “SELECT @i =” statements.

DECLARE @i INT
SELECT  @i = -1 -- first result
SELECT  @i = 55 -- second result
SELECT  @i = NULL -- third result



SELECT @i AS OriginalValue,

-- first CASE format. DON'T USE THIS!
CASE @i
WHEN -1 THEN '-1'
WHEN NULL THEN 'We have a NULL!'
ELSE 'We landed in ELSE'
END AS DontUseThisCaseFormatValue,

-- second CASE format. USE THIS!
CASE
WHEN @i = -1 THEN '-1'
WHEN @i IS NULL THEN 'We have a NULL!'
ELSE 'We landed in ELSE'
END AS UseThisCaseFormatValue

When the value of @i is –1 everything works as expected, since both formats go into the –1 WHEN branch.

CaseResult1_thumb

When the value of @i is 55 everything again works as expected, since both formats go into the ELSE branch.

CaseResult2_thumb

When the value of @i is NULL the problems become evident. The first format doesn’t go into the WHEN NULL branch because it makes an equality comparison between two NULLs.
Because a NULL is an unknown value: NULL = NULL is false. That is why the first format goes into the ELSE Branch but the second format correctly handles the proper IS NULL comparison.

CaseResult3_thumb_1

Please use the second more explicit format. Your future self will be very grateful to you when he doesn’t have to discover these kinds of bugs.

How to open a Windows command prompt

In current folder.

1 Ordinary method

Shift + Right Click

Then click

How to open a Windows command prompt[1]

2 Run as administrator

Copy a shortcut of Command prompt. Change the “start in” property.

How to open a Windows command prompt[2]

Copy to any folder you want to run it. With this, you can open a prompt with administrator permission.

Internet Explorer Operation Aborted

Error

Cannot open Internet website, Operation Aborted

无法打开Internet站点,已终止操作

Happens in

  • Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0
  • Windows Internet Explorer 7

Reason

Unsupported code syntax.

Solution

Upgrade to Internet Explorer 8

Why do I receive an “Operation aborted” error message when I visit a Web page in Internet Explorer?

What Happened to Operation Aborted?

探寻转型期中国社会的政治哲学

本文为原书序言。

“波兰尼指出,民主是一种妥协的艺术,但大众的参与,绝不意味着大众掌握了妥协艺术。施特劳斯的“隐秘”真理,或许也是因为他不相信大众能够妥协。”


探寻转型期中国社会的政治哲学

2002 汪丁丁

《The Limits of Liberty》(“自由的界限”),这本书的英译序言作者Hartmut Kliemt(现在任职于法兰克福金融与管理学院)指出,一方面参与了关于无政府主义的讨论,另一方面参与了关于正义理论的讨论。也因此,布坎南为这本书拟定的副标题是“在无政府与利维坦之间”。

读者或许首先要求解释“利维坦”与“正义”之间的联系,为什么追求正义的人们可能接受并帮助一个政府成长为庞然大物(利维坦)以致他们的自由最终和他们追求的正义一起被这只利维坦巨兽吃掉?Anthony de Jasay(亚赛)早年是一位匈牙利经济学家和哲学家,与他的匈牙利同胞海撒尼(John Harsanyi)一样,1948年因躲避政治迫害离开匈牙利,从奥地利辗转至澳大利亚。数年后,海撒尼从阿罗(Kenneth Arrow)在斯坦福大学研读他的第二个博士学位,亚赛则辗转至英国并获得牛津大学研究职位。后来,亚赛在巴黎一家银行就职,再后来,他成为独立银行家,在欧洲和美国都有投资。退休后,他继续发表无政府主义论著。1985年他发表《论国家》,引起布坎南的格外关注。2007年,布坎南和一群寻求当代无政府主义理论基础的学者发表文集《良序的无政府》(ordered anarchy),旨在阐释和发挥亚赛的一系列简明但深刻的见解。顺便说一句,他们当中至少一位作者认为亚赛,一位退休银行家,是我们时代最伟大的政治哲学家。我在“自由基金”网站下载了亚赛的或许是最后一部作品,《Justice and Its Surroundings》。这部2002年发表的作品,为读者提供了上述问题的清楚解释。与亚赛一样,或许不那样偏激,布坎南坚持契约论的方法论个人主义思路。他在《自由的界限》开篇提出一个问题:无政府状态可否产生秩序?这样,他便直接参与了罗尔斯和诺齐克的那场辩论。

诚如布坎南本人和Kliemt所言,在布坎南的思想体系里,《自由的界限》(简称“界限”)应被视为他和图洛克(Gordon Tullock)1962年发表的《同意的计算》(简称“计算”)的姊妹篇。在“计算”里,个体的理性选择模型被用来解释关于“公共善”(public goods)的投票规则的选择。在“界限”里,如布坎南在第一章所说,这一模型被用来解释“公共恶”(public bads)的形成。这里所谓“公共恶”,就是借助民众投票同意而形成的“利维坦”。预见可能形成公共的恶,也就是预见自由的界限。那么,制度是如何失败,从而产生了公共的恶呢?这是布坎南写作“界限”时的基本问题意识。

布坎南指出,必须考察那些曾经有效的制度是怎样腐败和趋于失效的。换句话说,最初我们一致同意接受某种政府形式的强制,或放弃一部分个人自由,为了获得秩序。然后,当政府权力不断扩展,直到某一阈值之后,我们再也无法收回或抵抗这一强权,我们在哪些环节犯了错误?对于美国的情形,布坎南这样描写:“大萧条以降,我们见证了我们自己的利维坦的持续和加速扩张。……可以被称为宪政无政府的状态下,……人们越来越感到自己受不可名状的不负责任的官僚的支配,生活与无法预料的迂回曲折之中,私人预期被摧毁和扭曲,而却鲜有机会因此得到赔偿。”

以上所述,若将“大萧条”这一时点推迟七十年,即1999年以降,又何尝不是当代中国人日常生活的描写呢?“四面八方的人们要求废除官僚机构,……将个人从加速增长的税负之下解救出来。……但与此同时,要求公共控制继续扩展的呼声也大量存在。我们观察到,政府虽然将其指爪伸向各处,但在此期间,一般而言,由集体依法推行的最低限度的秩序似乎都在消失中。”布坎南追问:政府的存在本身是否在侵蚀社会所依赖的有序的无政府状态?个体在社会交往中自愿遵守行为规则时,创造了公共的善。当个体违反这些规则时,公共的恶出现了。以上文字,大致表达了布坎南这部著作的基本问题意识。

于是,我们可以探讨下一个问题:怎样界定权利?这是一种要严肃对待权利的呼吁(第三章)。布坎南承认,特定社会的文化传统在很大程度上已经界定了每一个人的权利。不过,他在第十章“脚注1”里批评哈耶克盲目尊崇传统。这一批评意味着,布坎南倾向于有更积极的传统革新,例如,他多年来努力推动的“美国宪法重订”会议。现在请读者回忆我开篇提及的亚赛的那一见解:权利源自契约,而不是契约基于权利。对布坎南而言,这仍是一个可质疑的假说。因为,布坎南指出,假如契约各方在一开始没有就任何权利达成共识,怎么可能订立有约束力的契约呢?一个著名的例,是尤士丁尼讨论过的,甲方认定乙方是一名奴隶,则他们之间的契约不能成立。产权经济学家表示反对,因为,奴隶可以怠工,从而奴隶主的理性选择是允许奴隶有更大的自由。看起来,我们有必要拓展契约概念,使能包括“隐契约”的情形。这样,产权之源于契约就符合情理了。类似地,布坎南可以争辩,我们也可以拓展权利概念,使能包括“隐权利”的情形。大致而言,我相信,诺齐克与罗尔斯都有理,因为权利与契约可以相生相用,只要允许概念拓展到包括“隐”情形。当然,隐的情形,不论权利还是契约,迟早都要隐入漫长的文化传统与行为模式当中去了(参阅第四章和第五章),所谓“the status quo”(可译为“既成事实”或“现状”)。在漫长的自然演化史中,最早出现的既成事实(权利),可称为“产权”——财产权利。根据洛克的解释,产权有三类:life(生命),liberty(自由),possessions(财产占有)。我称之为洛克的“广义产权”概念。洛克的产权定义,源于自然法传统。

布坎南在第六章和第七章的讨论,明显地受到他的老师奈特(Frank Knight)的深刻影响。奈特在1942年发表于《伦理学》杂志的文章“科学,哲学,社会过程”(“science,philosophy,and social procedure”《Ethics》vol. 52,no. 3,pp. 253-274),为我们理解“自由的界限”提供了布坎南传承的芝加哥学派政治经济学基础。在奈特看来,“社会过程”(不同于机械的“social process”)是社会重要成员之间的主动对话和达成共识的交互作用过程。共识,这是内在于社会演化的原因。在共识基础上确立的法律、政府、政策、以及个人权利等等,都是这一内在过程的外化,是演化的结果,不是演化的原因。即使在远古,人类社会也必定经历了这样的内在过程,只要有被认为重要的社会成员(母亲,酋长,或勇士)。当然,远古社会过程更可能发生的是在重要社会成员与神之间的对话及他们随后提供的权威阐释。在这一过程中,逐渐形成了“既成事实”,或最初的“律法”。奈特在同一杂志发表的另一篇文章里指出,立法者的基本问题在于:怎样的变法可能使法律在未来的演变更符合群体的长期利益?事实上,一个群体长期而言能够达到何种文明发展水平,几乎完全依赖于这一群体能够容纳多么巨大的个体差异同时不使社会秩序因这些差异而趋于瓦解。对于布坎南而言,民主制度的精要,就是“一人一票”。他开篇明确提出这一假设,并拒绝柏拉图“哲人王”的思路。他指出,任何一群人,基于一人一票的社会过程,不论他们的选择多么低俗或高尚,这是他们的选择,应被视为是正当的。如果全体同意(一致同意)原则的成本太高,一人一票的社会过程可能选择偏离全体同意原则的投票原则,例如,简单多数原则或代议制,那么,我们可以应用布坎南在1960年代提出的“俱乐部理论”,仍是基于个体理性选择的。

可是,这样的社会过程既可以改善社会普遍的状况,让每一个人都有更多的自由——如果“自由”可以定义为每一个人潜质的充分发展,也可导致公共的恶——如果从这一过程中形成的集权自我强化为利维坦怪兽。这是布坎南在第七章以后,直到第十章,即本书结束时,始终要面对的难题。

无政府状态,即想象中每一个人拥有完全自由的状态,是布坎南政治哲学假设的初始条件。最接近这一状态的政府,被称为“最小政府”,也被认为是“最好的政府”——that government is best which governs least。由相互尊重的自由人组成的社会,被称为“无政府主义乌托邦”。吴稚晖是民国初年一位著名的无政府主义者,据张国焘回忆,吴稚晖曾告诉陈独秀,无政府主义者的革命需要五百年以后才有实现的可能,在那之前,他追随孙中山的国民党。中国早期最著名的无政府主义者,诸如刘师复,常以其品格高尚,得以感召许多青年参加无政府主义运动,他们赞成克鲁泡特金的口号:“无政府,即无强权”。另一方面,中国青年人普遍受到无政府主义理想的道德感召。德里克在其名著《中国革命中的无政府主义》中指出,中国道家和佛家思想传统为中国知识分子接受无政府主义思潮提供了极佳的环境。据此,以及其它更重要的原因,二十世纪中国革命各色各样的领导人,在早期几乎都是无政府主义者。德里克指出:“无政府主义理想对中国社会现实实际上是一种挑战,并触及到了中国政治的核心问题。这或许能够说明,无政府主义在已失去了在中国现实政治中的发言权时,为什么仍拒绝从中国政治中消失的原因。”

如果说,二十世纪中国革命的思想开端是无政府主义的民主话语,那么,这一系列革命运动的政治结局何以总是公共之恶呢?自上而下的改革多次失败,从而救亡转变为大众革命,我推测,这是革命导致公共之恶的一个重要原因。大众革命倾向于完全摧毁既有秩序,并如马克思主义经典作家早已指出的那样,为革命之后的反革命独裁创造了政治条件。有鉴于此,为免于公共之恶的结局,我们多数人可能主张改革而不主张革命。

可是,为什么中国历史上的许多改革都以失败告终?一个直观的解释是,反对改革的力量过于强大。我认为,更令人信服的解释需要到中国的“社会过程”内部去寻找。

博兰尼在《个人知识》的开篇曾解释过,法国知识分子羡慕海峡对岸英国“光荣革命”取得的成就,可是他们模仿的英国民主演变为雅各宾党人的“红色恐怖”。博兰尼指出,民主是一种妥协艺术,大众的参与,绝不意味着大众掌握了妥协艺术。施特劳斯是芝加哥政治学派的政治哲学教父,他相信,真理不可让大众知道,否则,就很危险。所以,他的“小圈子”,颇类似毕达哥拉斯学派或墨子学派那样,是从核心到外围逐层扩展的秘密或半秘密组织。为什么大众不能知道真理(truth,可译作“真相”)?或许就因为他不相信大众能妥协。

古今中外,群众运动几乎不变的特征,是“过激”。我认为,借助Daron Acemoglu(阿西莫格鲁,MIT的明星经济学家)等人2010年提交给应用概率论年鉴的一篇学术论文(“opinion fluctuations”,paper submitted to the Annals of Applied Probability),可以建立一个社会网络模型,为这一现象提供科学解释。让我们假设全部可能的观念,极端的和不极端的,均匀分布在全部人口当中,并且全部人口均匀地嵌入在一个平面网格之内。那么,根据阿西莫格鲁的“观念波动”模型,这一平面网络里的各种观念最终的波动均衡,取决于那些最顽固地坚持自己观念的人,不取决于那些更愿意修正自己观念的人。我们知道,如果一个头脑可能被任何观念占有的概率服从均匀分布,显然,它被一个极端观念占有的时段会比它被一个不极端观念占有的时段长得多。这是因为,“极端”通常意味着“顽固”,或者,如果因为年轻而不如此顽固,就一定意味着从一个极端跳到另一个极端。

于是,大众不能妥协,我们有阿西莫格鲁的观念波动模型作为我们这一判断的理论依据。只要发动群众,就必定导致达成均衡的观念,是极端的,而不是折衷的。下一个问题是,怎样的政治制度更可能产生妥协?

代议制,这是图洛克的论证——他被布坎南认为是对现实政治制度和官僚政治具有最卓越洞察力的人。图洛克论证,在代议制结构里,各党派的魁首之间最可能达成妥协。所以,“党魁”也就是政治企业家。这是借用了科斯的见解,任一可延续的社会里,必定有两类企业家,其一是政治的,其二是经济的,他们共同的职能是创新,制度创新与经济创新。

党魁之间的交易,最可能发生的事情,除了政治妥协之外,还有腐败——即交易各方为了增加私人利益而牺牲自己选民的利益。事实上,我们很难区分党魁之间的政治“妥协”与“腐败”。所以,根据激励理论,我们只能借助于可观察的信号。如果我们享有普遍的选举权,如果每N年举行一次大选,又如果没有“免费搭车”即不投票的选民,那么,通过N年一次的淘汰过程,最腐败的党魁最有可能首先被淘汰出局。假设N不是很大,例如,是4或5,那么,经过相当漫长的时段,例如一百年,我们可以预期,代议制的总成本,在边际上大致相当于政治妥协过程中党魁腐败造成的总成本的边际量。

就中国目前政治格局,我们不难推测,与多党代议制相比,更可能形成的是执政党内各派魁首之间达成政治妥协的过程。但是,由于以上的分析,这一过程的合理性,要求执政党的最高权力掌握在至少三位领导人而不是如现在这样的两位或一位领导人手中。在理想的政治格局中,由于“合作博弈”理论和“夏波利值”(Shapley value)在政治科学领域广泛运用所取得的成就,我们希望执政党内形成一个多数派和两个享有合法权利的反对派。为实现这一可行方案,执政党的组织部和宣传部,必须分解为党内各派相互独立的组织部和宣传部。当然,执政党只有一个中央局(政治局)。不过,政治局常委名额的分配,即党内各派在政治局常务委员会里获得的代议权,必须能够充分体现“党内代议制”这一宪法思想。

中国社会的政治转型期,与经济转型期相比,应当更加漫长。这是因为,经历了二十世纪的百年革命之后,我们前面还有大约一百年的路途。周虽旧邦,其命维新。我不揣冒昧,将这篇文章献给二十二世纪的年轻人。